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iglTRADE POLICY,  COMMERCIAL MARKET  RELATIONSHIPS,  AND  EFFECTS  ON
WORLD PRICE STABILITY
The United States
George E. Rossmiller, Fred A. Mangum, and Leo V. Mayer
A review of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) budget testimony reveals
important characteristics of U.S. agricultural trade policy  through  time.  One
characteristic has been an apparent preference for less rather than more
Government intervention in the trade process.  A  second  is  that the  United
States,  like all other countries, has found its agricultural  trade policies
generally shaped by its domestic-price and income-support programs.
The result is that U.S. agricultural trade policy has shifted as domestic
policy has changed.  Specifically, there have been three  important watersheds
in U.S. farm policy orientation that have altered the course of U.S.
agricultural trade policy.  First,  prior to  1933  the  focus  of  U.S.  farm policy
was developmental.  Internal population expansion provided  the  opportunity for
agricultural growth with a minimum of Government outlay.  Government  support
was resource oriented--land dispersal and the development of its productivity.
Agricultural commodities  dominated the nation's exports  during  this early
period.  As late as 1900, farm exports accounted for three-fourths of  total
export sales, although a relatively small percentage of  total  agricultural
production.  Trade policy for agriculture, unlike that for  the  nonfarm sector,
generally favored open markets although growing protectionism toward the end
of the period culminated in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act  of  1930.
The collapse of  farm prices after World War I and the passage of the
Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1933  marked  a  turning point  for both  U.S.  farm
policy and agricultural trade policy.  Policy emphasis shifted  from
developmental to compensatory.  Programs shifted  from focusing on land to
focusing on the products of  land, with relatively high and rigid price
supports that sought a return to the more prosperous 1910-14 period.
The early part of  the period saw increasing Government involvement in
agriculture, with commodity prices determined more by Government policy than
by market  forces.  The  latter part of  the  period--from the  end  of  World  War  II
through 1960--brought a slow realization that  satisfactory incomes  for some
farmers could not be provided by manipulating commodity prices alone.  As a
consequence, greater attention was given to community development, rural
industrialization, improved education, and regional development policies after
1960.
Throughout  this  30-year  period,  agricultural trade policy  was  a  captive  of  an
inward-looking domestic policy.  Exports accounted for a relatively minor
portion of  total  farm output  and  consequently  exerted  little  influence  on
policymaking.  Surpluses,  generated  by  high price  supports,  created  mounting
67interest in  both domestic and foreign disposal programs.  Section 22  and
voluntary import restraints sought to protect the established price levels.  12/
A  second major turning point came in  1963 when wheat producers rejected a
mandatory acreage control plan.  The new policy tilt came to full flower with
the passage of the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973.  This
period was marked by a  turning away from high price supports and relatively
tight controls on output in  favor of greater reliance on market determined
commodity prices and income support derived as needed from target prices and
deficiency payments. 13/  This philosophy has continued since and has had
obvious implications for U.S. agricultural trade policy and relationships with
our trading partners.
Viewed from a  trade policy perspective these three periods have seen the
United States move from colonial days when agriculture was open and accounted
for most of the Nation's foreign-exchange earnings through an inward-looking
period where policy priorities were given to inflexible per unit price
supports resulting in  large and expensive surpluses,  to a  more recent period
of trade expansion.  The combination in  the sixties and early seventies of a
rejection by farmers of greater Government control and resistance by taxpayers
to increased storage and disposal  costs led to an agricultural trade policy
more open to the world.  This openness has been threatened recently in
reaction to the effects of the world economic slump and mounting surplus
stocks.  The U.S. agricultural sector, after perhaps another period of high
price supports and even export subsidies, for its own long-term health will
need to become even more open and interdependent with the world economy.
This brief historical review, and the underlying fact that agricultural trade
policy is  dependent upon the domestic farm policy in  place at the time,  leads
us to several observations.  First, in  recent decades there has been a  greater
reliance on the export market for U.S. agriculture.  Second, this reliance has
brought about increased price and income instability for U.S.  farmers.  Third,
it  has also  led to growing economic and political linkages with other
governments.
Comparing the fifties and sixties with the period of  the seventies shows the
effects of  two sharply differing policy orientations.  Moreover, the
comparison suggests changes are needed in  both farm and trade policy measures
to meet conditions of the eighties.
To state the obvious, export markets and, by implication, trade policy has
assumed a larger role in  recent years  for U.S. agriculture.  Total U.S.
agricultural exports averaged $3.7  billion per year in  the fifties, increased
to $5.8 billion annually in  the sixties  and jumped to $19.7 billion in  the
12/  Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935, as amended,
requires the President to establish import quotas on price supported
commodities, irrespective of existing international agreements,  'whenever
imports threaten the ability of the Government to carry out the domestic
price-support program.  Since 1951, the United States has had a  waiver in  GATT
for the use of  Section 22.
13/  Obvious exceptions remained:  dairy, tobacco, and peanuts.
68seventies.  As a  percentage of cash receipts  from farm marketings, exports
increased from 11.8 percent in  the fifties, to  14.4 percent in  the sixties,  to
22.6 percent in  the seventies and have grown to almost  30 percent in  the
eighties.
The rapidly growing importance of agricultural exports to  U.S. farmers  and to
the general economy cannot be over emphasized.  In  1981, the U.S. exported
$43.8 billion worth of agricultural products, an all-time record.  With
agricultural  imports of $17.2 billion,  the net gain in  foreign exchange from
U.S.  agricultural trade was $26.6  billion.  Agricultural export sales
accounted for approximately 30 percent of total farm sales  in  1981.  But,
these aggregate figures do not tell the full story.  For some commodities the
export market is  even more important:  approximately 65 percent of the wheat,
35 percent of the corn, 41 percent of the soybeans, 54 percent of the cotton,
and  67 percent  of the rice produced in  the United States in  1981 went into the
export market.  Moreover, agricultural exports in  1981 contributed 1.1 million
jobs  and $43.8 billion dollars of GNP to the national  economy, according to
USDA's Economic Research Service.
The relatively rapid growth of U.S agricultural exports is  a  result of a
combination of events.  Foremost has been the growth in  world population and
the global rise in  real consumer incomes.  Other factors that have driven up
the  import demand for U.S. agricultural exports have been the general
reduction in  tariff levels worldwide and, prior to 1980, the low relative
value of the U.S. dollar on world markets.  Clearly, also, changes in  domestic
support programs that placed relatively less  emphasis on loan rates and more
on income support via deficiency payments was a  major factor in  stimulating
export growth.  Real  loan rates generally decreased  from 1950 to the
mid-seventies for wheat and corn and have since  increased.  Perhaps more
importantly, seasonal average prices received for both wheat and corn were
less than loan rates for most of the fifties  and generally exceeded the loan
rate afterward indicating  less market  interference.
While  the focus thus far has been concerned with the total value of
agricultural exports, a  distinction is  needed between crops and  livestock
products.  Most changes in  domestic support policies were directed to grains
and  soybeans and only indirectly affected  livestock.  U.S.  support for meat
prices has generally been confined to the price enhancement provided by import
quotas.  On the other hand, dairy products have been assisted both by domestic
price supports and effective import constraints.
U.S.  trade policy for both meat and dairy products serves as a  considerable
irritant to our  trading partners.  Reflecting trade policy restraints  (among
other reasons) in  both the United States and other trading countries, world
trade in  meats and dairy products has not increased as has trade in  grains and
oilseeds, which tends to be much less influenced by trade restrictive policy.
While both domestic agricultural support policies and agricultural trade
policies have changed to accommodate a  favorable growth in  U.S. agricultural
exports,  there have been costs as well.  Of  special interest is the increased
variability in  farm prices and incomes in  the United States and, to a  lesser
degree in  world markets, a  variability associated with a  more open trade
policy and a  domestic support policy that departs from dependence on rigid,
relatively high price supports.
69Table 1 provides decade by decade comparisons of variability in selected
indicators important to the U.S. farm sector.  As a generalization, the
estimates  indicate a  growing variability through time.  Variation in  farm
income was ameliorated by government payments and by growing off-farm income,
especially for smaller farm units.  These results are  consistent with those
reported by Penn for slightly different time periods. 14/
Besides  the increased variability, the recent downward  trend in U.S.
agricultural exports  is of no small concern to farmers and policymakers.  FY
1982  agricultural exports declined to $39.1 billion from $43.8 billion in FY
1981, and estimates for FY 1983 exports suggest a further decline to around
$35.0 billion.  The growth and stability of export markets  are of  importance
to the continued prosperity of  the U.S.  farmer.
Data in table 1 show an increasing variability of selected indicators of farm
income over the three most recent decades.  ERS has estimated an increasing
instability in U.S. export volumes.  In 1950, according to their estimates,
the instability was such that an estimate of U.S. export volume would have had
a standard error of plus or minus 8  percent representing approximately 5.5
million metric tons.  In 1980,  .the  standard error of the estimate had climbed
to plus or minus 12 percent and represented 16 million metric tons.  The rate
of increase in volume instability has grown much faster in the United States
than elsewhere.
Two major causes of international market instability are weather and policy.
Some argue that as production has been pushed out  into marginal, semi-arid,
rain-dependent lands  and as high-yielding varieties have been adopted that are
more susceptible to weather vagaries than are traditional varieties, the
variation in cereal production on the world basis has increased.  For the
comparison of the decades of the sixties and the seventies the statistics show
only a slight increase in variation.  The average deviation from trend
increased from 22.5 million metric tons in the sixties.to 38.6 million metric
tons  in the 1970's: (table 2).  The coefficient of variation in world cereal
production during the sixties was 2.4 percent, increasing only slightly during
the seventies to 3.0 percent.  Given that only about 15  percent of total
cereal production in recent years has been traded  in world markets, the
instability brought about from variations in production as countries enter or
exit or change between  importing and exporting can be significant.  It has, in
factL,  been decreasing.  The average deviation from trend declined from 7.2 to
6.2 million metric tons while the coefficient of variation for world cereal
trade decreased from 7.7 percent in the sixties to 4.2 percent for the decade
of the seventies.
A  more important source of  instability for the United States than either
weather or internal policy changes  is  the policy actions of others.  Most
countries  in the world today, other than the United States, operate through
state trading mechanisms, or with border protection measures, or a combination
of both that insulate their domestic economies from the vagaries of  the world
market.  Thus, most countries do not adjust or adjust only very sluggishly to
world market conditions.  They in turn are not sharing in the adjustment
14/  Penn, J.  B.,  "The Changing Farm Sector and Future Public Policy:  An
Economic Perspective," Agricultural-Food Policy Review:  Perspectives for the
1980's, U.S. Dept. Agr.,  Econ. Res. Serv.,  AFPR-4, April 1981, page 47.
70Table 1--Comparison of variability (coefficient of variation)
in selected  indicators of farm income, 1950-79 1/
Indicator  :  1950-59  : 1960-69  : 1970-79
:  Percent
Total cash receipts from farm  :
marketings  :  5.6  10.8  28.3
Operator's net income from
farming  :  9.7  11.8  29.1
Real capital gains from real  :
estate  :  152.6  70.8  72.9
Index of prices received by  :
farmers  :  8.0  4.1  23.7
Index of  crop prices received
by farmers  :  6.3  3.2  15.7
Index of livestock and
product prices received  3.8  9.3  23.7
Value of agricultural exports  :  16.6  12.9  44.5
1/  Coefficient of variation is  a  measure of  relative
dispersion around the mean.  It  is  the standard deviation
divided by the mean multiplied by 100 and expressed as a
percentage.
burden but rather have been able to shift a  disproportionate, although
declining in  relative terms,  adjustment to the United States.  During the
sixties the average deviation from trend of world trade excluding the United
States was 2.9 million metric tons while that for U.S.  trade was 5 million
metric tons,  nearly twice as  large.  The respective coefficients of variation
were 5.3 percent and 12.9 percent.  In the seventies the average deviation
from trend for world trade excluding the United States,  increased to 3.5
million metric tons while the same  for U.S. trade  increased to  7.2 million
metric tons,  slightly over twice as  large.  The respective coefficients of
variation declined to 4.7 and 9.5 percent, thus, the relative stability of
U.S. trade increased slightly but remained almost twice as unstable as trade
of  the rest of the world.
In comparing the standard deviation and coefficient of variation statisties in
table 2 of world trade and  its component parts  (that is,  world trade excluding
the United States and U.S. trade),  one might suggest that the direction of
instability in the components tended to be opposite from each other, thus
tempering the  instability in world trade as a whole.  This observation is
particularly pronounced in the  latter period, suggesting that the farmer-owned
71reserve, while not particularly a stabilizing  factor for U.S.  trade, has been
a stabilizing influence on world trade in total.  One  might  expect  this
conclusion given the nature of the farmer-owned reserve,  the  rules  by  which  it
has operated and the fact that the United States has been the only intentional
adjustor  in  the  system  to  world-market  conditions.
It  would appear that a  "more open" agricultural and trade  policy  is  achieving
the  objective  of  increased  farm  income  but  without  significant  declines  in
price and  income instability.  The impact of  instability is  felt keenly on the
larger,  commercial farm  operations  which  produce  the  majority  of  agricultural
commodities.  Parallel reasoning suggests  that the benefits of rising income
in the seventies and declining  income in  the early eighties  also  affected  most
the  larger farm units.
Apart from the shocks  imparted to the U.S. farm sector by the volatility of
shifts  in  relatively inelastic demand and  supply functions of  foreign
countries, three  specific factors that contribute  to  instability are worthy of
note.  First is  the  failure of the  farmer-owned reserve  to  provide  expected
increases in  market stability.  The logic of  the reserve  was  to  allow  the
market  to  work  within  the  bounds  established  by  the  loan  rate  as  a  floor  and
the  (mandatory) release price as a  ceiling.  The reserve apparently serves
this purpose well with relatively small market stock  overhangs  but  appears  to
have all the weaknesses of any state  stocking scheme when large demand-supply
imbalances  are present.
Second, macroeconomic decisions have also affected  agricultural trade:  the
1973  soybean embargo, the rapid growth of exports  to the USSR and Eastern
Europe in  the seventies  (and the 1980 decision to partially embargo grain
exports to the USSR).  Obviously, such foreign-policy decisions  are  impossible
for  producers  to anticipate  and  yet  they affect  U.S.  farm  prices  and  income  as
well as  those of our trading partners.
Third, policy actions taken by other countries also affect  the ability of  the
United States to  export.  This  category includes  the growing use of  export
subsidies by Brazil and the EC but also includes  financial difficulties that
cause governments to  drastically curtail imports.  The sum of  all these
Government actions, U.S.  and other, explains in  large part the greater
variability of U.S.  farm income and veils the effects of U.S.  agricultural and
trade policies.
An  interesting speculation is  how much world instability would there have been
in  the absence of U.S. farm programs.  Two programs,  land retirement and
stocking, have been especially valuable in  reducing unwanted quantities
reaching the market in  surplus periods and thus preventing further price
declines, or in  increasing quantities entering the market in  periods of
shocLage and thus reducing price increases.  U.S. carryover stocks of wheat
exceeded the annual volume used domestically in  12 consecutive years in  the
fiftLies and  sixties.  The coefficient of variation of  farm prices received in
these two decades was a  relatively low 8  percent and 4  percent, respectively,
even though carryover was unusually low in  1952.  By contrast in  the
seventies, the coefficient of variation of prices received increased to 24
percent.
72Table 2--Statistical comparisons of world production, world trade,  world
trade excluding the United States, and U.S.,  1960-80
Item  :  1960/61-1969/70  :1970/71-1979/80
World  production:
"Best  fit" form  :  Exponential  Exponential
R2  0.94  0.88
Mean (million metric tons)  :  943.3  1275.1
Standard deviation (million metric
tons)  :22.5
Coefficient of variation  (percent)  :  2.4  3.0
World  trade:
"Best  fit" form  :  Power.Exporiential
R2  .61  .94
Mean (million metric tons)  . 92.8  147.9
Standard deviation (million metric)
tons)  7.2  6.2
Coefficient  of variation  (percent)  :  1.7  4.2
World  trade,  excluding U.S trade:
"Best  f  ofrm  :  Power  Linear
R2  !19  .70
Mean (million metric tons).  54.1  72.7
Standard  Deviation  (million  metric
tons)  2.9  3.5
Coefficient  of  variation  (percent)  :  5.3  4.7
U.S.  trade:
"Best  fit"  formg  Power  Power
R2  .28  .89
Mean (million metric tons)  :  38.8  75.3
Standard deviation  (million  Tmetric
tons).  5.0  7.2
Coefficient of variation (percent)  :  12.9  9.5
.73NOTES
1.  "Best fit" form choices were  linear, power, exponential,  and logarithmic.
In all cases X values representing time were taken as 1,... ,10.
2.  The mean is:
N
i
Xi/N,  that  is,  the simple average.
3. Standard  deviation  formula used  was:
N
4.  Coefficient  of  Variation  formula used  was:
Standard deviation X 100
Mean
The  coefficient  of  variation  is  the  relative  dispersion  of  a  variable
expressed  in percentage  terms.
74The eighties are  likely to see an intensification of both the instability and
the slackening of demand in  export markets.  With the world economies in
recession, increasing unemployment and high inflation rates have caused a
slackening in  demand in  the international market.  Both  intensified  export
competition and  increasing protection have been the result in  the past couple
of years.  Improvement on both counts depends in  large degree on world
economic recovery.
The problem is  exacerbated in  the United States by  the  strength  of  the  dollar,
the bumper crops of the past 2  years, and the trade practices of other nations
that have excluded the United States  from certain markets and have reduced its
ability to penetrate other markets, particularly in  the  high-value  category.
Thus, the situation today is  dramatically different than it  was even as
recently as when the 1981 Farm Bill was passed.  The cost estimate for the
4-year life of the 1981 Farm Bill,  when it  was passed, was $8  billion.  The
confluence of factors resulting in  slack demand at home  and  abroad  at  the  same
time have drastically softened commodity prices and curtailed exports.
Moreover, the 1981 Bill  included what appears in  hindsight  to  have  been  target
prices and  loan rates that were higher than warranted given the domestic
economic situation and the rapid slowing of  the inflation  rate,  and  the
strength of the dollar in  foreign currency markets.  The  result  is  that the
cost of the Bill in  the  first year alone stands at $12  billion  and  is  expected
to  reach about $21  billion in  the second year, with little expectation of any
sharp  declines  in  the  cost  during  the  remaining  years  of  the Bill.  Concern
and  frustration is  growing in  Congress with the practices of competitor
nations in  the international market and with the cost  of  the  farm  program.
The failure of the GATT Ministerial Conference to make  any  substantive
progress on agreements  to turn back protectionist tendencies  and  to  limit
unfair competitive trading practices intensifies the  frustration.
Thus, major changes  in  the 1981 Farm Bill are  likely in  1983.  The debate is
likely to be hot and  lengthy, turning on the fundamental  philosophic  base  upon
which our agricultural and trade policy should rest.  On  the  one  hand,  some
will  argue  that  we  should  return to  the  farm  program orientation  of  the
fifties, with high support prices and rigid production controls through large
diversion  programs  to  hold  resources,  especially  land,  out  of  production.
Proponents  of  this  policy  direction  would  argue,  either  explicitly  or
implicitly, that production for the export market is  too costly when all  costs
are considered and,  therefore, the United States  should turn inward, produce
for  the domestic market and forget about exporting  to  the rest of the world.
On the other side will be those who will argue  that the United States is  the
last holdout of an ever increasing number of nations that have rejected the
concepts of  free trade and  comparative advantage and that we can no longer
alone  afford  to  continue  our  open-market,  free-trade philosophy.  This  group
may  argue  that the  United  States  should  be  prepared to  use  whatever  tools  are
neceasary to meet the export competition and to engage in  whatever trade
actions  that  may  be  necessary  to  capture  or  recapture world  markets  lost
through unfair practices  of  others  in the  past.  Some  of  this  group  would
further  argue  that  this  strategy  would  lead  to  free  trade in  the  end  as  the
treasuries of  competitor  countries  become  depleted  and  they  are no  longer  able
to finance the unfair trade practices and will thus be forced to the
negotiating  table.
15There are  three major problems with the  first alternative.  First, with 30
percent of  farm sales derived from the export market today, it would require
substantial  increases in commodity prices  to maintain, let  alone increase,
farm incomes with production only for the domestic market.  It  is  doubtful
that consumers  or  taxpayers,  or  both,  will  be  willing  to  foot  the bill.
Second, U.S. agricultural exports account for 39 percent  of  total  world
agricultural exports.  A disproportionate  share of  the  commodities  being
exported by the United States are basic food needs for a significant portion
of  the populations of many countries.  On humanitarian grounds  alone,  it  would
be  extremely  inappropriate for  the  United  States  to  turn its  back  on  the
export market.  Third, a recent ERS study shows that U.S.  agriculture has
gained  considerable economies of size through increasing  production  for  the
export market during the past couple of decades.
The second possible policy direction also presents  some  difficulties.  First,
it  Is an  extremely high risk alternative in that trade conflicts,  like
military wars, may be difficult to  limit and contain  once  they  are  started.
Second, the last thing the world needs at this point  is  a  disruption  or
decline  in trade flows.  The only way many countries can  hope  to  come  out  of
their precarious foreign debt situations is through increased trade flows  that
provide for greater rather than less  foreign exchange earnings.  Third,  loss
of  the gains  from trade by consumers and producers,  even  by  those  unprotected
producers who are competing with protected producers for resources represent
losses  to the world economy that can never be recaptured.  Again,  the  world
economies do not need those kinds  of losses, particularly in their present
circumstances.  Finally, engaging in trade wars takes a substantial war chest
of funds.  Unless the United States were to choose targets with a great deal
of care to make sure it  can inflict the greatest amount of damage to other
country's treasuries, at minimal  cost to the United States, we simply may not
be able to afford such a venture.  Overriding these concerns, however, is the
further concern among some people that  if  the United States moves away from
the free-trade philosophy it has expounded in the past,  there will be
virtually no challenge to those nations attempting to  increase their
protection or unfair trade practices in the future.  It  would  be  very
difficult for the United States to make such challenges  if  we  abandon  the
principles  of  free  trade.
Given  the present situation and the need to make some major changes  in the
1981 Farm Bill,  and indeed to begin  looking toward the new Farm Bill in  1985
when the present Bill is scheduled to  expire,  it is  appropriate to consider
the list of  international factors  that should be taken  into account in
crafting such changes.
We start from the premise that with the heavy and growing dependence of the
U.S. farm sector on exports  it is  now essential that domestic agricultural
policy  be  formulated  and  implemented  with  considerable  regard  for
international markets  and  the  ability  of  U.S.  farmers  to  compete  in  that
market.  It must also be recognized that domestic policy will trigger policy
responses  from  other  nations,  trade competitors  and  trade partners alike.
Finally, it must be recognized that in the normal course of other nations
developing their own domestic agricultural policies, the effect of  those
policies  will  be  felt  in  the  United  States.  U.S.  policy  must  be  flexible
enough  to  adapt  and  adjust  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities  this  might
present and to ward off  the adverse effects that may be presented.
76Several factors that have become important, or increased in  importance within
the past several years, must be recognized  and considered in  any policy
debate, even though they are external to the influence of domestic
agricultural policy.  First is  the relationship between interest rates,
exchange rates, and commodity prices.  Generally, interest rates and exchange
rates are positively correlated while commodity prices are negatively
correlated with both.  High interest rates  in  the United States,  for example,
increase the international  demand for dollars and contribute to an
appreciation of the dollar against foreign currencies.  Other things equal,  a
strong dollar makes the United States  less competitive  in  the export market.
High interest rates also decrease purchases of  farm commodities,  domestic and
foreign alike, due to the increased cost when interest costs are  included and
due to the increased carrying cost of stocks.  Similarly, high interest rates
increase the cost of working capital and of  carrying stocks by the farm
producer.  All of  these factors contribute to a  softening of commodity prices
and, thus, to a  cost-price squeeze for farm producers.  Thus, monetary policy
has become an extremely important determinant of  farmer well-being.
Second, given that international trade and international  finance are flipsides
of  the same coin, the health of the international  financial system is  an
important determinant of the level of trade that can be maintained.  The
alarming increase in foreign debt burden of virtually all the LDCs and many of
the centrally planned economies is  cause for grave concern, both in  its own
right and in  its  influence on trade.  It  has been estimated that in  the coming
year approximately $50 billion of additional  loan funds will need to be
generated just to service existing foreign debt--without consideration of new
loans.  If  these funds cannot be generated--and the commercial banking
industry is  quite pessimistic--a significant  increase in  de facto country
defaults  (reschedulings) can be expected.  Not only has the creditworthiness
of many countries declined to the point that they are poor risks for export
credits, the need for scarce foreign exchange for debt service reduces further
their ability to import.  The depressed state of the economies of the
developed world have been transmitted to the developing world through slack
demand for LDC exports, causing a  further decline in  foreign exchange
generation by the LDCs and economic stagnation in  their domestic economies.
This in  turn has caused further slackening of their demand  for imports,
including for agricultural products.
Summary
We can sum up the characteristics of U.S.  agricultural and trade policy in
recent years by indicating it  is  more open to,  and interdependent with, the
world market than in  the decades of the fifties and sixties.  The volume of
agricultural imports and exports has grown both absolutely and relative to
U.S. production.  This growth is  in  response to both pull factors acting on
demand as well as policy measures that affect supply and facilitate exports.
Real loan rates  (for grain) have generally trended downward over the past 32
years, although there was a  rather abrupt change in  1976.  In only 4  years
since 1960 has the nominal loan rate for wheat exceeded the season average
farm price and the same for corn.  Deficiency payments beginning in  1963 have
offset some of the declining income support of lower loan rates while being
more trade neutral.
77Accompanying a more flexible  loan rate and increased support  through  other
than the price support mechanism has come a greater variation in price and
income support for domestic producers.  Reflecting a  more  open  trade policy
and greater interdependence, this price variability has been transmitted to
other market economies.  We note, however, that an increasing number of
countries have essentially shielded their producers and  consumers from all
price movements through a variety of measures that include state trading,
quotas, two-price  systems, and variable levies.
Price variability is perceived in this country as an  expected  result  of  a
free--market economy, that, while imposing some added cost  in the  form of  risk
also offers the opportunity for profit.  In this sense the more open economy
facilitates commercial relationships and, in  fact, business firms generally
consider any Government intervention an anathema.  In  other  countries,  any
form of  instability,  including price variation, is  often  looked  upon  as  an
evil to be avoided.  As a result, Government  intervention often exercises more
control,  and  by  being  directly  injected  into  the  commercial  process,  often  is
itself a sotrce of instability.
In this environment changes are needed in the U.S.  agricultural trade policy.
Ideally, the United States might persuade others to  allow the market a greater
role in allocating resources,  to accept a larger burden of price adjustment,
and to harmonize policies to some degree  to prevent "excessive" price
variation.  Failing this, the United States may feel forced to adopt policies
that insulate domestic producers  from the increasing  instability to which the
United States has contributed, but which more and more is  the result of a
thinner residual free market.
78Appendix table 1--World production and trade of total grains
and U.S.  exports of total grains,  1960/61  1981/83 1/
World trade
World  :as percent of:  U.S.
trade 2/ :  world  :  exports
Production
:U.S.  exports  :World trade
:as percent  of:  excludi~ng




























































































































































Total grains include wheat.  corn,  sorghum, barley, oats,  rye,  and milled
Trade data 'exclude  ttra-ESC trade.
Prelim  nary.








II (I  ~  I  II  11)  1~  ~  ~r  r  7 \1Appendix table 2--Corn loan rate,  1950/51 - 1982/83
Ratio
Year  :  Loan rate :  CPI 2/  Real  loan  :  Season  :  average
1/  ::  rate  :  average 1  price to
























































































































































































































1/ Leath, Mackc I.,  L. H. Meyer, and L.  D.- Ha,
Dept.  Mgr.,  Econ. Res.  Sari,.,  AER-479, Tables 2,/  Econo  3.  a prt of  the  President, U .S.-  Go,
Table  B--50,  January 1981.
./  Agricultural Outlook, page 37,  June 1983.
4/  1982/83 estimated on basis of  4 months.
L11. U.S. Corn Industry, U.S.
32  and  43,  February  1982.
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3/Appendix  table  3--  -Wheat loan  rate,  1950/51-  1982/83
Loan rate
I/
CP  2 Real  loan
rate
tRatio
* Season  :average
*average  1/:  price  to



































































































































































1/  Held,  W.G.  ,  U  .S.  Wheat  Industry, U. S.  Dept.  Agcr.,  Econ. Res.  Ser~v.,
Tables  19  and  26,  April  1980.
2/  Economic  Rio  t  f  the  President,  U.S.  Govern ment  Printing  Office,  table
B-SO50,  January  1981.
3/  A riculturl  Outlook,  page  37,  June  1983.
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*  0  Ratio
Year  : Loan rate :.  CPI  :  Real  loan  :  Season  :  average
1/:  rate  : average  :  price to









































































































































































































1/Appendix table 5--Soybean loan rate,  1950-82
Season  :  Ratio average
Year  :  Loan rate  :  CPI  :  Real  loan:  average  :  price



































































































































































































































































A  CIIP  IAA  A~  ~  AC ~AIAAppendix  table  6--Tobacco (flue-cured) loan  rate,  1950-82
Season  :  Ratio average
Year  :  Loan  rate  :  CPI  Real.  loan:  average  :  price





































































































































































































...  AA  CAppendix table 7--Cotton loan rate,  1950-82
Season  :  Ratio average
Year  :  Loan rate  :  CPI  Real loan  average  :  price

























































































































































































I/  Choice B loan rates.  For producers selecting
1959 was  3410 and in 1960 was 3242.
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1.24
1.13
1.0 2
.93
1.03
.93
.97
.92
.95
1.30
1.13
1.00
.98
.99
.99
.97
1.03
1.32
1.14
1.09
1.08
1.45
1.40
2.29
1.58
1.42
1.65
1.17
.22
1.26
1.59